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Making Space for Women: Explaining Citizen Support
for Legislative Gender Quotas in Latin America
Tiffany D. Barnes, University of Kentucky
Abby Córdova, University of Kentucky
Gender quotas have been adopted in over a hundred countries in an effort to address gender disparities in national
legislatures. Yet the determinants of citizen support for gender quota policies remain largely understudied. We develop
a theory that emphasizes the impact of institutional performance and political values to explain citizen support for
gender quotas and how these two factors differentially influence men’s and women’s quota support. Based on data for
24 Latin American countries, we find that citizens in countries with relatively good governance quality who express a
strong preference for government involvement to improve citizens’ well-being show the highest levels of quota support.
Further, whereas good governance increases quota support at a higher rate among men than women, preferences for
government involvement exert a stronger influence on women’s support for quotas. Consequently, good governance
quality reduces the gender gap in quota support by substantially increasing men’s support for quotas.
Women are underrepresented in the vast majorityof political decision-making bodies worldwide(Bauer and Tremblay 2011; Escobar-Lemmon
and Taylor-Robinson 2005; O’Brien 2015). This global trend
undermines one of democracy’s core principles—political
equality (Dahl 2006). In light of this challenge, since the early
1990s, international organizations have pressed for govern-
ment action to correct gender inequalities in political repre-
sentation. These initiatives have resulted in the enactment of
gender quota policies in more than a hundred nations (IDEA
2015), with Latin America being “in the vanguard of the
gender quota movement” (Jones 2009, 56). As of 2015, close
to half the countries in this region had implemented a state-
mandated legislative gender quota—a law requiring parties to
reserve space for women on their list of legislative candidates.
Extant research has examined the effectiveness of quotas
for increasing women’s numeric representation (O’Brien and
Rickne 2016 ; Schwindt-Bayer 2009; Tripp and Kang 2008),
their effect on the representation of ordinary women’s inter-
ests (Barnes 2016; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008), and their
impact on symbolic representation (Alexander 2012; Barnes
and Burchard 2013; Clayton 2015; Córdova and Rangel,
forthcoming; Zetterberg 2009). Scholars have also explored
the influence of international advocates (Bush 2011; Hughes,
Krook, and Paxton 2015) and domestic elites (Htun and Jones
2002) in the initial adoption of gender quotas. Yet a funda-
mental question has received little attention: What factors
promote higher levels of citizen support for state-mandated
legislative gender quotas?
Citizen support for quota policies has important impli-
cations for the legitimacy of democratic regimes. If quota
adoption is met with low approval, increases in women’s
numeric representation in parliament may ultimately come
at the cost of political legitimacy (Meier 2008). The legiti-
macy of the political system will always be in question as
long as a large share of citizens do not perceive institutions
designed to select representatives as “the most appropriate
and proper ones” (Lipset 1983, 64). If citizens do not regard
political institutions as legitimate, they may disengage from
the political system, resulting in low participation and con-
sequently in weak democracy. Indeed Clayton (2015, 26)
provides evidence that when gender quotas are adopted
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“without local buy-in,” quotas generate “negative unintended
attitudinal reactions.” Her findings indicate that perceiving
quotas as illegitimate ultimately leads citizens to disengage
with the polity.
We contribute to the gender and public opinion lit-
eratures by developing and systematically testing an inte-
grative theory of how individuals’ political values and a
country’s institutional performance influence citizen support
for state-mandated legislative gender quotas. We theorize
that, at the individual level, citizens who view the government
as responsible for improving ordinary citizens’ well-being—
and hence support government involvement—will exhibit
greater support for quota policies. Individual-level mecha-
nisms are not, however, sufficient to explain variation in
support for quotas across countries. We also posit that heu-
ristic information derived from governance qualitymoderates
the relationship between individual preferences for govern-
ment involvement and support for quotas. More specifically,
our theory highlights the importance of a government’s track
record to consistently deliver positive policy outcomes across
issue areas for cultivating quota support.
If the capacity of the entire government apparatus is
limited, citizens are likely to be cynical about its ability to
deliver promised outcomes and thuswill perceive the adoption
of quotas as largely inconsequential for advancing equality in
society. Consequently, in this case, citizens will exhibit low
levels of support for quotas. Moreover, poor governance will
attenuate the positive impact of individual preferences for
government involvement on support for quotas. In sum,
simply favoring government involvement in principle is in-
sufficient to engender support for quotas when in practice
one’s government has failed to demonstrate that it canmake a
substantial difference through the implementation of public
policies. As we show below, the theory we develop also allows
us to explain the cross-national variation that exists between
men and women in levels of quota support.
Latin America offers a fitting setting to test our hypoth-
eses. First, the substantial variation in governance quality
across Latin American countries allows us to evaluate our
theorized connection between institutional performance
and quota support. Moreover, available public opinion data
for the vast majority of countries in the region facilitate a
systematic assessment of the determinants of support for
quotas. Thus, although our theory in general can be tested
in other contexts, existing data allow us to focus on Latin
America. The study of citizen support for gender quotas in
the Latin American context is, however, a particularly
pressing issue. Close to half of the countries in the region
have already adopted gender quotas, and adoption of these
continues to spread. In order to enhance the legitimacy of
democratic regimes, it is imperative to identify the factors
that promote citizen support for political institutions de-
signed to improve gender equality in Latin America.
Our findings carry with them important policy impli-
cations. First and foremost, our results make it clear that
unless governments demonstrate capacity to govern effec-
tively, a variety of affirmative action policies, such as gender
quotas, are unlikely to receive widespread public support.
And we know from previous research that citizen support is
critical for policy enactment and maintenance as well as
future reforms (Brooks andManza 2007; Soroka andWlezien
2010). Thus, even though international actors and domestic
elites have played an important role in quota adoption, there
is every reason to believe that citizen support for gender
quota policies can be instrumental not only for the adoption
and continuation of quotas but also for the improvement of
quota design. Numerous examples suggest that this has been
the case in the Latin American context.
The “popular mobilization” of ordinary women to de-
mand the adoption of quotas was an important factor in ush-
ering change in many countries across Latin America and
other regions of the world (Baldez 2004, 237). For example, in
Argentina, on November 6, 1991, women’s movements or-
chestrated a “massive mobilization” (Carrio 2005, 166) of over
5,000 women, who filled the parliamentary galleries and hall-
ways and overflowed onto the streets to pressure political elites
to adopt the quota law (Chama 2001). Beyond quota adoption,
women’s movements also motivated ordinary women to agi-
tate for reforms to strengthen existing quota laws in Latin
American countries such as Mexico, the Dominican Republic,
and Ecuador (Araújo and García 2006). Many of these efforts
were met with success, suggesting that ordinary citizens have
influenced the process of quota adoption and reform in the
region. Citizen support for quotas can then be particularly im-
portant for pressing political elites to expedite the strength-
ening of the quota laws recently enacted in El Salvador (mu-
nicipal quotas) and Chile in 2015, which will certainly require
additional reforms to be effective over time (Piscopo 2015).
Taken together, our theory and findings indicate that good
governance quality is critical for cultivating citizen support for
gender quotas, which can ultimately result in the adoption and
improvement of quota laws to guarantee high and continued
women’s numeric representation in parliament.
Our research also has important theoretical and policy
implications beyond gender quota laws. As we elaborate in
the conclusion, the theoretical framework we develop here
can guide future research to identify the role of governance
quality on citizen support for policies designed to improve
the political representation of other disadvantaged and mi-
nority groups in society, such as ethnic and religious mi-
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norities. More broadly, our aim is to inform future research
evaluating how governance quality influences citizen support
for a variety of policies designed to strengthen democracy,
including electoral and other institutional reforms. Improve-
ments in governance quality may well also prove necessary for
fostering citizen support for many of the policies currently
topping the agendas of policy makers around the world.
EXPLAINING CITIZEN SUPPORT FOR GENDER
EQUALITY POLICIES: PREVIOUS STUDIES
Prior research shows various individual traits and attitudes
influence citizen support for gender equality policies. Sex,
for example, is an important predictor of citizen support for
policies that benefit women (Cassese and Hannagan 2014;
Deckman and McTeague 2015). Due to self-interest, citizens
are expected to favor policies that are likely to benefit them
(e.g., Meltzer and Richard 1981; Sears and Funk 1990).
Accordingly, existing work on support for gender quotas
among citizens in Canada (Gidengil 1996) and political elites
in Belgium (Meier 2008) finds that women are more likely to
favor quotas than men. Previous research also shows that
women are more likely than men to favor gender equality
(Morgan and Buice 2013), and hence they also are more
likely to support gender equality policies such as fair pay,
parental leave, and protection from job discrimination in
hiring and promotion (Cassese et al. 2015; Strolovitch 1998).
Although these findings give strong support to the self-
interest thesis, empirical literature also demonstrates that self-
interest is not enough to explain variation in citizen support
for public policies in general and gender equality policies in
particular. Pro-social values are also important determinants
of support for public policies (Funk 2000). Belief in equality of
opportunity (egalitarianism), for instance, predicts citizens’
preferences for welfare policies (Bobo 1991; Feldman 1988).
In the case of gender issues, individuals who hold gender
egalitarian values report higher support for gender equality
policies. Cassese et al. (2015), for example, find that in the
United States, citizens who exhibit sexist attitudes are less
likely to support policies to ensure equal pay for equal work.
We argue that explanations that focus on self-interest
and pro-social values are still insufficient to explain support
for quotas. As we theorize in the next section, at the indi-
vidual level, political values (i.e., preferences for govern-
ment involvement) should also play an important role in
shaping citizen quota support. Yet individual-level accounts
of citizen support for quotas still fall short. We maintain
that explanations that do not consider the effect of con-
textual factors are incomplete. Accordingly, we develop an
integrative theoretical model that takes into account the
role of both individual and contextual factors.
HOW DO CITIZENS FORM OPINIONS ON PUBLIC
POLICY? AN INTEGRATIVE THEORETICAL MODEL
We develop two sets of related hypotheses on how personal
political values and contextual factors reinforce each other
and together explain support for public policies. Although
our theory is broad and can be applied to the study of public
opinion on an array of public policies, our substantive focus
is on citizen support for gender quota policies. At the in-
dividual level, we expect that, on average, favoring govern-
ment involvement for improving citizens’ well-being will
increase gender quota support. In addition, we posit that the
strength of this individual-level relationship will vary across
countries. Contextual factors related to institutional per-
formance will condition the impact of citizens’ preferences
for government involvement on quota support across
countries and will also influence the overall-level of support
for such quotas. Moreover, we draw hypotheses on how
these dynamics differentially shape men’s and women’s
quota support. Below we develop the theoretical basis for
each of these claims and derive our specific hypotheses.
The impact of political values
Citizens’ core political values are also important determinants
of support for public policy. In particular, independent of
ideological orientations (as measured by traditional liberal-
conservative or left-right scales), citizens’ normative beliefs
about the role government should play in improving living
conditions shape policy preferences (Kumlin 2007),1 with
those supporting government activism being more inclined to
attribute responsibility to government for reducing inequality
and protecting marginalized groups (Goren 2013). Accord-
ingly, individuals who demand government intervention are
more supportive of race-based affirmative action policies
(Bobo and Kluegel 1993). Building on this research, we posit
that gender-based affirmative action, in our case gender
quotas, will on average enjoy higher support among those
who favor an active role of government in improving ordinary
citizens’ lives. Consequently, we test the following hypothesis:
H1. On average, citizens who express higher support
for government involvement to improve citizens’well-
being will be more likely to support state-mandated
gender quota policies.
However, we also argue that support for government
involvement is more likely to translate into high support for
1. Ideology is only weakly correlated with citizens’ beliefs about the
role of government (Goren 2013; Zechmeister and Corral 2012), sug-
gesting that these constructs are theoretically distinct.
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affirmative action policies for some citizens than for others.
Citizens have different beliefs about the origins of social
inequality, which in turn affect their support for policies
designed to benefit marginalized groups, including gender
equality policies (Burns and Gallagher 2010). Regarding
gender issues, some citizens attribute gender inequality to
discrimination and fewer opportunities in society, whereas
others blame women’s personal choices (Gurin 1985).
Those who believe gender inequality is a product of struc-
tural barriers are more likely to support government inter-
vention to mitigate gender disparities (Krook, Lovenduski,
and Squires 2009). Consequently, we argue that individuals
who simultaneously attribute gender disparities to unequal
opportunities and also believe it is the government’s re-
sponsibility to improve citizens’ lives are more likely to
support laws that give women a chance to be included in the
candidate lists of political parties, that is, gender quotas. By
contrast, people who believe that gender inequality is due to
individual women’s choices are likely to reject government
intervention intended to increase opportunities for women
(Gidengil 1996; Krook et al. 2009) regardless of their overall
level of support for government involvement.
We posit that these dynamics have important conse-
quences for determining how support for government in-
volvement differentially affects men’s and women’s quota
support. Even if both men and women favor government
involvement, because men are far less likely than women to
attribute gender disparities to unfair treatment and limited
opportunities (Swim et al. 1995), men are subsequently
much less likely than women to translate their general views
on government involvement into support for gender quotas.
For example, previous studies clearly demonstrate that
women are more likely than men to believe that wage gaps
occur due to differential treatment in the workplace and
society (Cassese et al. 2015). Consequently, women aremuch
more likely than men to consider government involvement
essential for reducing wage gaps. Because men, by contrast,
are more likely to believe that wage gaps are the product of
individual women’s choices, they tend to conclude that en-
suring equal pay for women is “not the government’s busi-
ness” (Cassese et al. 2015, 13). Similarly, because women are
more likely than men to attribute the underrepresentation of
women in political posts to discrimination (Gidengil 1996),
their support for government involvement on social issues
will also hold the government responsible for leveling the
playing field for women. Taking into account these insights,
we derive the following hypothesis:
H2. Citizens who express higher support for gov-
ernment involvement will be more likely to support
state-mandated gender quota policies, and this effect
will be stronger for women than for men.
Governance quality as heuristic information
Even after considering their political values and predis-
positions, citizens may still lack the information needed to
firmly determine their stand on a given policy. As a result,
they are likely to seek external sources of information. In
the absence of complete information, citizens resort to cues
or messages they retrieve through “top of the head” pro-
cesses with the objective of making inferences about a policy
issue and subsequently determine their position on the
policy (Zaller 1992). “Source cues” in particular—references
to prominent political actors or institutions—serve as im-
portant heuristic information that can ease individuals’ de-
cisions on how much support to concede to a policy when
they lack full information (Mondak 1992, 1993). Political
institutions involved in the execution of a given policy can
then condition citizens’ policy endorsement. More specifi-
cally, literature in political psychology suggests that an
institution’s credibility aids citizens to evaluate the signifi-
cance of policies associated with the institution and thus in-
fluences their level of policy support (Bartels and Mutz
2009). As Mondak (1992, 458) explains, institutional credi-
bility functions as “a political currency” that allows political
institutions to “purchase some increment of policy approval.”
These insights have important implications for the building
of a theoretical model of citizen support for state-mandated
gender quotas and other policies.
The first implication we draw from this literature is that
the credibility of government, as given by the extent of
governance quality in a country, is likely to provide im-
portant heuristic information employed by citizens to decide
their level of support for public policy, including support for
gender quota implementation. Through a top-of-the-head
process, citizens are likely to search for objective evidence in
their national context about their government’s institutional
credibility in being able to successfully execute its policy
intentions. More specifically, our theory is distinct as it
posits that, when determining their level of policy support,
citizens rely on retrospective performance evaluations of the
entire government apparatus they derive from their national
context and that those evaluations are not limited to the
incumbent’s administration but go farther in time.
In contrast to literature on policy support that focuses on
the effect of a lone political institution’s credibility, such as
the reputation of political parties (Downs 1957; Fiorina
1981), the Supreme Court (Mondak 1992), or Congress
(Bartels and Mutz 2009), we maintain that citizens assess
the worth of a given policy by processing heuristic infor-
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mation from their national context on the institutional ca-
pacity of government as a whole and thus on the capacity of
the different institutions that make up government to work
cooperatively and consistently produce good policy out-
comes. Indeed, cross-national empirical evidence shows that
the overall quality of policy is highly dependent on the ca-
pacity of different entities of government not only to effi-
ciently carry out their individual mission but also to coor-
dinate their efforts and work towards a common goal (Stein
and Tommasi 2007). Consistent with this view, individual-
level studies for the United States demonstrate that confi-
dence in government rooted in perceptions of government
performance increases citizen support for public policy that
benefits racial minorities (Hetherington 2005; Hetherington
and Globetti 2002). Here we theorize that citizens resort to
heuristic information on governance quality they obtain
from their national context to inform their decision on their
level of policy support. Consequently, our theory identifies
the national context as an important source of heuristic
information.
The second part of our argument states that the extent of
a government’s credibility is likely to hinge on its demon-
strated capacity to consistently deliver good policy outcomes
across policy areas. For instance, even if the incumbent
administration competently implements a given policy, if
the government has a track record of consistently failing to
deliver across a range of policy domains that affect ordinary
citizens’ day-to-day lives (such as failure to provide basic
services or fight crime and corruption), the government is
unlikely to gain sufficient credibility in the eyes of the public
to secure high policy support. Thus, independent of the
incumbent administration’s performance, the credibility of
government is largely determined by its overall governance
trajectory. Hence, we posit that a track record of poor gov-
ernance lowers citizens’ support for public policy. Con-
versely, a track record of good governance will instill confi-
dence in government and increase support for public policy,
including gender quotas. Taking into account these propo-
sitions, we hypothesize:
H3. In countries with a better track record of gover-
nance quality, citizens will be, on average, more likely
to support state-mandated gender quota policies.
Although citizens are likely to rely on heuristic infor-
mation derived from governance quality (i.e., source cues)
to determine their level of policy support, recent research
suggests that they will also take into account the content of
the policy being described (Bullock 2011). Consequently,
expressed policy preferences are not simply derived from
readily accessible information in citizens’ minds, such as
the credibility of government, but also from their assess-
ments of the policy in question. We extend this argument
and posit that the degree to which citizens rely on heuristic
information relative to policy content largely depends on
citizens’ personal interest in the policy being described.
Self-interest motivations will be weighted more heavily in
women’s considerations to support gender equality policies
than heuristic information provided by source cues, even if
women had no prior knowledge of or experience with the
policy. This implies that women will have a higher level of
quota support than men, independent of whether a country
has adopted a quota.
In contrast, in the absence of strong self-interest moti-
vations, men will rely more heavily on source cues than on
policy content to form their opinions on gender equality
policies. Indeed, previous cross-national research shows that,
when men form their opinions on gender issues, they are
more amenable to elite cues derived from national context
than women (Morgan and Buice 2013; Morgan, Espinal, and
Hartlyn 2008). Consequently, we argue that the credibility of
government will have greater influence on men’s level of
support for gender quotas than women’s. Previous studies
suggest that this is plausible. Hetherington and Globetti’s
(2002) findings for the United States, for example, indicate
that at the individual level, confidence in government has a
stronger effect on policy support among individuals who do
not benefit directly from the policy. More specifically, we
posit that heuristic information derived fromnational context
on a government’s track record of performance will partic-
ularly aid men to determine their extent of support for quota
policies, independent of their initial level of information
about quotas and whether or not their country has already
adopted gender quotas laws. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H4. In countries with a better track record of gov-
ernance quality, citizens will be more likely to sup-
port state-mandated gender quotas, and this effect
will be stronger for men than women, thereby re-
ducing the gender gap in quota support.
Bringing individual and contextual
factors together
The theoretical ideas presented above suggest that both
personal political values and contextual factors related to
governance quality will independently influence support for
quotas and that each of these elements will have a differ-
ential effect on men’s and women’s levels of quota support.
Political values and governance quality, however, are un-
likely to work independently from each other. Our expecta-
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tion is that governance quality will moderate the individual-
level relationship between preferences for government in-
volvement and support for quotas. This is because even if
an individual holds normative beliefs that attribute respon-
sibility to government in improving citizens’ well-being, the
same individual might not be highly supportive of the actual
implementation of public policies that seek to achieve this
goal if governance quality is poor. Therefore, a track record
of poor government performance will attenuate the positive
relationship between support for government involvement
and support for quotas. In contrast, a track record of good
governance quality will reinforce the positive impact of
preferences for government involvement on quota support,
as citizens will have more faith that this policy will actually
lead to positive outcomes for society in general and women
in particular. Consequently, hypothesis 5 is as follows:
H5. The positive relationship between support for
government involvement and support for state-
mandated gender quota policies will be stronger in
countries with a better track record of governance
quality than in countries with a poor track record of
governance quality.
We are then left with an integrative theoretical model that
predicts interactive effects between three central variables:
support for government involvement, governance quality,
and sex. Support for quotas should peak among individuals
who live in countries with relatively good governance and
who also strongly support government involvement. More-
over, our theory indicates that, at the individual level, per-
sonal political values exert a stronger effect on women’s at-
titude formation than on men’s, increasing the gender gap
particularly among citizens who strongly support govern-
ment involvement. Nonetheless, in countries with good
governance, the overall gender gap will be offset due to the
stronger effect of governance quality on support for quotas
among men than women. Thus, in countries with good
governance, we should observe a smaller overall gender gap
in support for quotas than in countries with poor gover-
nance. The end result is an overall higher level of support for
quotas and a smaller gender gap in countries with good
governance quality in comparison to those with poor gov-
ernance. Thus, our final hypothesis states:
H6. Countries with a better track record of gover-
nance quality will show an overall higher level of
citizen support for state-mandated gender quota
policies, particularly among citizens with high sup-
port for government involvement, and a smaller
overall gender gap.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
To evaluate the extent of citizen support for quotas, we em-
ploy a survey question included in the 2012 round of the Latin
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey in 24
countries. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree), respondents were asked their extent of agreement with
the following statement: “The state should require political
parties to reserve some space on their lists of candidates for
women, even if they have to exclude some men.”
The wording of this survey item is particularly well suited
for the Latin American case, because the vast majority of
gender quotas that have been adopted across the region are
state-mandated legislative gender quotas in which the state
requires political parties to place female candidates on their
party ballot. Another advantageous feature of the wording
of this item is that it provides a description of the policy
rather than referring to “gender quotas” per se. Conse-
quently, even if a respondent is not familiar with the ex-
pression “gender quotas,” he or she can still formulate an
opinion on the policy described. Indeed, in countries with
no quotas, when asked about their level of support for
quotas using this survey item, only 2.6% of interviewees
responded “do not know” and only 0.83% refused to provide
an answer. The corresponding percentages in countries with
quotas are virtually identical, 2% and 0.8% respectively.
Based on data for this survey item across the 24 coun-
tries in our sample, the average level of support for gender
quotas is about 5 points. Yet there is also wide variation in
support levels across countries, ranging from 3.73 in Trin-
idad and Tobago to 5.95 in El Salvador (fig. 1). A one-way
ANOVA test revealed that differences in support for gender
quotas across the 24 countries are statistically significant
(p ! .001), suggesting that, once individual-level factors are
taken into account, country-level characteristics may ex-
plain some of this variation.2 As depicted by the frequency
distributions of the gender quota item across countries in
2. Based on the one-way ANOVA decomposition, we find that the
proportion of the total variance that is accounted for by the variance
between countries (i.e., the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient, ICC) is
statistically significant (p ! .001) and equal to about 7%. As explained in
previous studies (e.g., Anderson and Singer 2008), in cross-national re-
search, the variation between countries depicted by the ICC tends to be
relatively small in studies that use survey data because the number of cases
at the individual level is much larger than the number of cases at the
country level. Our results clearly show that our core independent variable
at the country level, Governance Quality, has a large and statistically
significant effect on quota support.
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figure 1, there is also substantial within-country variation in
quota support. In El Salvador, for example, quota support is
highly skewed, resulting in the lowest within-country vari-
ation in our sample (SD p 1.52). More than half (53%) of
Salvadorans express the highest level of support for gender
quotas (7 points), and only a small fraction (4%) expresses
the lowest level of support (1 point). Belize, by contrast, is
the case with the largest within-country variation (SD p
2.34). Although 41% of respondents express the highest
level of support for quotas in Belize, 20% express the lowest
level of support. Our theory seeks to explain the variation in
quota support observed both between and within countries.
INDIVIDUAL- AND COUNTRY-LEVEL
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Our core independent variables at the individual level are
sex and normative views about government involvement.3
Gender differences in quota support are assessed with the
measure Sex, coded 1 for women and 0 for men. Support for
government involvement is measured with an index based
on agreement with the following four survey items that
capture citizens’ views about government responsibility
(vis-à-vis individuals or the private sector) for improving
citizens’ quality of life:
1. The government, more than individuals, should be
primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being
of the people.
2. The government, more than the private sector,
should be primarily responsible for creating jobs.
3. The government should implement strong policies
to reduce income inequality between the rich and
the poor.
4. The government, more than the private sector,
should be primarily responsible for providing
health care services.
Responses for each of the items range from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Factor analysis indicated
that all four items load on a single factor and measure the
same underlying construct—support for government in-
volvement (see table A4 in the appendix, available online).
3. See the appendix for details on the coding, wording, and descriptive
statistics of all variables in our analyses. Tables A1–C2 and figs. A1–C3 are
located in the appendix.
Figure 1. Frequency distribution: Support for gender quota by country; SD p standard deviation
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The internal reliability of the index as measured by the
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is 0.81. The index was scaled
to range from 1 to 7, with 7 indicating the highest level of
support.
At the country level, our core independent variable is a
measure of Governance Quality. We use the Government
Capabilities Index from the Political Institutions, Govern-
ment Capabilities, and Public Policy International Dataset
by the Inter-American Development Bank (Chuaire and
Scartascini 2014). This index is particularly suitable for our
study, because it captures overall governance quality across
several policy areas and a government’s general capacity to
consistently deliver good policy outcomes, which we posit
will serve as salient heuristic information for citizens to
evaluate a government’s credibility. Instead of focusing on
a single policy area, the Government Capabilities Index
measures a government’s overall policy-making capacity.
Moreover, the index takes into account the combined per-
formance of four institutions found to be particularly impor-
tant for predicting a government’s policy-making capacity—
the legislature, political parties, the judiciary, and the bureau-
cratic apparatus (Stein and Tommasi 2007).4 Finally, the
measure incorporates the combined performance of these
political institutions overmore than a decade, instead of solely
focusing on the performance of the incumbent administra-
tion. Values on the index range from 0 to 4, with lower values
indicating lower levels of governance quality.Measured in this
way, governance capacity in our sample ranges from a low of
.342 for Haiti to a high of 2.39 for Chile and Jamaica.5
In addition to our main independent variables, we control
for a number of country- and individual-level variables. Our
argument suggests that a government’s overall governance
quality will influence citizens’ support for quota policies, in-
dependent of gender quota implementation. Consequently, at
the country level, we include in our models a Gender Quota
Index, which takes into account whether a country had im-
plemented a state-mandated gender quota before the LAPOP
survey was fielded, and if it did, whether a placementmandate
and enforcement mechanisms had also been implemented.
Indeed, to ensure an effective quota policy, electoral engineers
often promulgate rules that require parties to place female
candidates in electable positions on their candidate lists (Bal-
dez 2004; Krook 2009), and they also dictate enforcement
mechanisms that require all parties competing in elections to
comply with the quota rules (Jones 2009; Schwindt-Bayer
2009).6 Finally, we test the robustness of our results to the
inclusion of variables that account for Years since Quota im-
plementation and the Percent of Women in Parliament (see
online appendix table A8), to test the possibility that the effect
of governance quality on support for quotas is confounded by
the longevity of quota laws or women’s numeric representa-
tion in parliament.
To control for spurious sources of the relationship be-
tween good governance and support for quotas, we also
control for other country-level factors, such as the Gross
National Income (GNI) per capita using the most recent
estimates available prior to the LAPOP survey. We also test
the robustness of our results by including a measure of the
level of democracy (Democracy Level) at the country level.
Based on data from Freedom House International for 2011,
“partly free” countries in our sample are coded 1 and “free”
countries are coded zero. Finally, because the correlation
between the Governance Quality, GNI, and Democracy
Level variables is relatively high (ranging from 0.52 to 0.64),
we show that our results are robust whether we include or
exclude the democracy variable (see table 1) and whether
we use an alternative measure of democracy, Polity IV (see
appendix table A9).
At the individual level, since we hypothesize that the
impact of support for government involvement will be in-
dependent of Ideology and Gender Egalitarian Attitudes,
measures of both variables are included as controls. Ide-
ology is measured by asking respondents to place them-
selves on a 10-point left-right scale. To simplify the anal-
ysis, this variable is collapsed into three categories denoting
nominal ideology—Left, Center, and Right. Given that
nonresponse rates are high for ideology, we also recode no-
response values as a category and include it in the analysis.
To measure gender egalitarian attitudes, we employ a sur-
vey item that asks respondents their extent of agreement
with the following statement: “Some say that when there
is not enough work, men should have a greater right to
jobs than women.” We also test the robustness of our results
to the inclusion of two alternative measures of gender egali-
tarian attitudes (see online appendix tables A11 and A12).
4. For a description of the Government Capabilities Index, see ap-
pendix B. Importantly, to avoid a tautological relationship between the
index and support for quotas, the index excludes policies related to the
adoption of quotas, the gender composition of the legislature, or the type
of electoral system in place (i.e., that may affect the likelihood of women
being elected to office).
5. As a further robustness test, we replicate our analysis with an al-
ternative measure of governance quality that relies on a different mea-
surement strategy: the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness Index. As
we report in the appendix (table 7A and figs. A1–A4), our results remain
substantively unchanged if we use the Government Effectiveness Index. A
description of the Government Effectiveness Index is provided in ap-
pendix B.
6. For more details about the construction of this variable, see
table A2.
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To ensure that our results are independent of evalua-
tions of the current government’s performance, we control
for a variable measuring Perceptions of Incumbent Govern-
ment’s Performance, which is an index based on four ques-
tions in the LAPOP survey asking citizens to rate the per-
formance of the current administration on different policy
domains, including its capacity to improve the economy and
fight corruption.7 As the inclusion of women in politics is
likely to be favored primarily among those who value
democratic principles, we include a measure of Citizen Sup-
port for Democracy using a survey item that asks citizens to
what extent they agree that “Democracy is better than other
forms of government.” Finally, we control for socioeconomic
status and individual characteristics known to impact sup-
port for social policies including age, education, household
wealth,8 employment status, rural residency, marital status,
and number of children.
METHOD
To examine the country- and individual-level determinants
of support for gender quotas, we estimate multilevel models
that allow us to account for the nested nature our data, that
is, individuals i within countries j (Snijders and Bosker
2012). A key characteristic of multilevel models is that co-
efficients can be allowed to vary randomly between groups
(in our case countries). In their most basic form, multilevel
models assume random effects for the coefficient associated
with the intercept, and each group is allowed to have its
own intercept. This feature is convenient, because, in con-
trast to classical regression analysis, it allows the estimation
of standard errors taking into account the correlation of
error terms within groups, producing more accurate results.
In addition to a random intercept specification, researchers
can also allow the coefficients associated with other vari-
ables in the model to vary randomly between groups. Yet, as
Snijders and Bosker (2012, 106) explain, if there is theo-
retical reason to believe that an interaction between an
individual-level variable and a group-level variable exists,
as we do in this paper, this interactive effect can be tested
using cross-level interaction terms, regardless of whether the
individual-level variable has a random slope or not. The
reason for this is that statistical tests for cross-level interac-
tions supersede tests for random slopes (2012, 106).9 Fol-
lowing this advice, we test the significance of a three-way,
cross-level interaction between Sex, Support for Government
Involvement, and Governance Quality, assuming only ran-
dom intercepts (not random slopes). Thus, if our integrative
theory is supported, we expect to find a positive and signifi-
cant coefficient associated with this three-way cross-level
interaction term.
To evaluate hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 3, we first need
to estimate a baseline model (without the specification of
cross-level interaction terms). Specifically, we expect that,
on average, individuals who support government involve-
ment will exhibit higher levels of support for quotas (hy-
pothesis 1). In addition, we expect governance quality to
have an independent direct positive effect on quota support
(hypothesis 3). As a second step, we compare the results of
our baseline model with one that includes a three-way in-
teraction between sex, support for government involvement,
and governance quality. The three-way interaction model
specification also includes all lower-order terms that allow
us to test our interactive hypotheses (hypotheses 2 and 4–6)
while we hold other factors constant. Given that our de-
pendent variable is ordinal (7-point scale), we estimate the
following ordered logistic multilevel models with random
intercepts:
Baseline Model:
Support Quotaij p b0 1 a1Sex1ij
1 a2Support Government Involvement2ij
1 b1 Governance Quality1j
                              1… bnXnij 1 U0j 1 εij:
Three2Way  Interaction   Model:
Support Quotaij p b0 1 a1Sex1ij
1 a2Support Government Involvement2ij
1 b1 Governance Quality1j
                              1 g1(Governance Quality1j # Sex1ij) 
1 g2(Support Government Involvement2ij # Sex1ij)                              
1 g3(Support Government Involvement2ij
# Governance Quality1j)
                              1 g4(Governance Quality1j
# Support Government Involvement2ij
# Sex1ij)1… bnXnij
                              
1 U0j 1 εij:
Here U0j represent random effects for the intercept across
countries, and εij are errors at the individual level.
FINDINGS
Models 1 and 2 in table 1 present the baseline model. As
expected, we find that support for government involvement
and governance quality have an independent positive effect
on citizen support for quotas (p ! .001), lending support for
7. See table A5 for details about this variable.
8. For details on the construction of this variable, see Córdova (2008).
9. Snijders and Bosker (2012, 106) write that if there is a significant
cross-level interaction, “the test for this interaction has a higher power to
detect this [interaction] than the test for the random slope.”
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Table 1. The Determinants of Support for Gender Quotas
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Sex (female p 1; male p 0) .362*** .355*** 1.068** 1.049**
(.028) (.028) (.351) (.365)
Support for Government Involvement .366*** .373*** .369*** .382***
(.013) (.012) (.044) (.047)
Governance Quality (Government Capabilities Index) .317*** .389*** .537** .623***
(.035) (.039) (.171) (.182)
Sex # Support for Government Involvement 2.082 2.080
(.063) (.065)
Sex # Governance Quality 2.779** 2.755**
(.237) (.248)
Governance Quality # Support for Government Involvement 2.022 2.025
(.029) (.031)
Sex # Governance Quality # Support for Government Involvement .105* .102*
(.042) (.044)
Country-level controls:
Quota Index .185*** .084*** .075*** .084***
(.012) (.011) (.012) (.011)
GNI per Capita 21.757*** 2.718*** 21.722*** 2.682***
(.184) (.184) (.213) (.185)
Democracy level (partly free p 1; free p 0) .197*** .203***
(.037) (.037)
Individual-level controls:
Left (ideology 1–3 p 1; 8–10 p 0) .116* .103* .111* .104*
(.045) (.045) (.045) (.045)
Center (ideology 4–5 p 1; 8–10 p 0) 2.010 2.016 2.010 2.012
(.041) (.041) (.041) (.041)
Right (ideology 6–7 p 1; 8–10 p 0) 2.041 2.032 2.035 2.027
(.044) (.044) (.045) (.044)
Ideology nonresponse (p 1; 8–10 p 0) 2.032 2.033 2.034 2.027
(.046) (.046) (.046) (.046)
Support for democracy .094*** .093*** .092*** .093***
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.009)
Gender egalitarian attitudes .021** .018** .021** .019**
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Perception of incumbent government’s performance .031** .035*** .032** .035***
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.010)
Quintiles of wealth .0171 .0191 .0191 .0201
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.010)
Education level .027 .017 .028 .017
(.022) (.022) (.022) (.022)
Rural (p 1; urban p 0) 2.0571 2.0531 2.0541 2.0521
(.031) (.031) (.031) (.031)
Married or common law marriage (p 1; single p 0) 2.016 2.006 2.008 2.003
(.034) (.034) (.034) (.034)
Divorced, separated, or widowed (p 1; single p 0) 2.109* 2.0931 2.0991 2.086
(.055) (.055) (.055) (.055)
Number of children .002 .003 .003 .003
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008)
Age .000 2.000 .000 2.000
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Note. Number of respondents p 17,083; number of countries p 24. Multilevel ordered logit models with random intercepts. These results were produced
using Stata 13.1 using the “meologit” command. Standard errors are in parentheses.
1 p ! .10.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
*** p ! .001.
hypotheses 1 and 3. These findings are consistent with our
theory that both political values and heuristic information
derive from institutional credibility are important deter-
minants of quota support. Moreover, self-interest, as mea-
sured by sex, also influences citizen support for gender
quotas, with women expressing higher support than men.10
Models 3 and 4 in table 1 present the results associated
with our interactive hypotheses (hypotheses 2 and 4–6).
Given that testing these hypotheses requires taking into ac-
count a series of interactions between three variables (Sex,
Support for Government Involvement, and Governance
Quality), we evaluate each hypothesis based on the fully
specified model that includes the three-way interaction and
all lower-order constitutive terms. The positive and statisti-
cally significant coefficient associated with the three-way in-
teraction term lends preliminary support for our integrative
theory, indicating that the effect of each of the three variables
on support for quotas is conditional on the others. As Kam
and Franzese (2007) point out, however, the signs and sta-
tistical significance of interactions and their constituent
terms can be difficult to interpret, especially in nonlinear
models. Indeed, interaction and constitutive terms lack mean-
ing on their own. We therefore follow the recommendation of
Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) to present substantive ef-
fects and their confidence intervals graphically. We present
the predicted probabilities generated from estimates of model
4 in table 1. Specifically, we estimate mean predicted proba-
bilities taking into account the information for each indi-
vidual in our sample across all the independent variables in-
cluded in our models.11
We display graphically the average predicted probability
of having the highest level of support for quotas, namely,
a level of 7 on the 1–7 scale. Panels A and B in figure 2
evaluate graphically hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. As
hypothesis 1 predicts, we find that, other things being equal,
there is a strong positive relationship between support for
government involvement and support for gender quotas
(panel A in fig. 2). Yet, as hypothesis 2 suggests, this finding
is more nuanced. Women are more likely to favor gender
quotas than men when support for government involve-
ment is high. As shown in panel B, at the lowest level of
support for government involvement, men and women have
a similar probability of supporting quotas—about 11%.
When support for government involvement is at its highest
level (7 on a 7-point scale), however, a significant gender
gap emerges: women are about 10 percentage points more
likely than men to express high support for quotas, at 58.4%
versus 48.0%, respectively.
As shown by panels A and B of figure 3, hypotheses 3
and 4 are also supported by the data. Consistent with hy-
pothesis 3, we find that governance quality significantly
increases support for quotas on average (panel A), but also,
consistent with hypothesis 4, the size of this effect varies
between men and women (panel B). Panel A demonstrates
a strong substantive effect of governance quality, where the
probability of strongly supporting quotas is 32.8% for
countries with the lowest level of governance quality, but
rises almost 20 percentage points to 51.1% for countries
with the highest level.
Moreover, panel B in figure 3 shows that for countries
like Haiti at the lowest end of the Government Capabilities
Index, the average probability of expressing high support
for quotas is 27.9% and 38.8% among men and women,
respectively, a difference of more than 10%. Yet, at the
highest level of the Government Capabilities Index, the
gender gap effectively vanishes, with the probability of
having high support for quotas at 49.4% for men and 54.0%
for women. Consistent with hypothesis 4, this finding
demonstrates that in countries with much lower gover-
nance quality, men have more reasons for opposing gender
quotas than women. Not only are men less likely to per-
ceive such programs as being in their self-interest but also
the poor track record of their government in implementing
policies effectively erodes support for quotas.
Next, we evaluate hypothesis 5, which posits that the
effect of support for government involvement on quota
support is stronger among individuals who live in countries
with a better track record of governance quality than in
countries with a poor track record. Figure 4, panels A and B,
display the effect of support for government involvement on
quota support among individuals who live in a country with
poor governance quality (a score lower than one) and good
governance quality (a score higher than two), respectively.12
The patterns observed in figure 4 provide strong support for
hyothesis 5. Among citizens who live in countries with poor
governance quality (panel A), the probability of having high
10. We also find that citizens who have strong beliefs about democ-
racy being the best form of government, who display gender egalitarian
attitudes, who place themselves on the Left (i.e., 1–3) of the left-right
Ideology scale, and who perceive that the incumbent administration is
doing a good job show higher levels of support for quotas. SES and de-
mographic factors, however, do not exert a strong effect.
11. Predicted probabilities were computed using the command “mar-
gins” in Stata 13.1.
12. An alternative graphical representation of this result is presented
in fig. A5. This figure is also reproduced for our alternative measure of
governance quality (the Government Effectiveness Index) in fig. A6.
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support for quotas increases from 10.4% to 49.3% as one
moves from the lowest to the highest level of support for
government involvement, resulting in an increase in quota
support of 38.9%. By comparison, among citizens who live
in countries with good governance quality (panel B), mov-
ing from the lowest to the highest levels of support for
government involvement results in a significantly larger
increase (47.3%) in quota support.
In the last part of our analysis, we test the hypothesis that
countries with a better track record of governance quality will
Figure 2. Effect of Preference for Government Involvement. Mean predicted probabilities were computed based on model 4 in table 1. Shaded areas represent
95% CIs estimated using the delta method.
Figure 3. Effect of Governance Quality. Mean predicted probabilities were computed based on model 4 in table 1. Shaded areas represent 95% CIs estimated
using the delta method.
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show an overall higher level of citizen support for state-
mandated gender quota policies—particularly among citi-
zens with high support for government involvement—and a
smaller overall gender gap (hypothesis 6). Figure 5 shows how
the positive and significant three-way interaction in table 1
translates into support for hypothesis 6. Panel A presents the
effects of preferences for government involvement on quota
support in countries in our sample with relatively low gov-
ernance quality (i.e., with a score lower than 1 on the Gov-
ernment Capabilities Index), and panel B graphs this rela-
tionship for countries with high governance quality (i.e.,
with a score higher than 2 on the index). As panel B plainly
shows, consistent with hypothesis 6, the effects of governance
quality on quota support depend on both support for gov-
ernment involvement and gender. Not only is the overall
level of support for quotas higher but also the overall gender
gap in support for quotas is smaller in countries with good
governance quality (panel B) than in countries with poor
governance (panel A). Specifically, the overall probability of
having high support for quotas is 9.9% higher in countries
with good governance quality than in countries with poor
governance, and this effect is primarily driven by individuals
who strongly support government involvement. Further-
more, the overall gender gap in support for quotas is half the
size in countries with good governance than in countries with
poor governance—shrinking from 10.4% to 5.2%. The gap
diminishes in panel B due to the much stronger effect of good
governance quality on men’s support for gender quotas than
on women’s support.
FURTHER ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: TESTING
ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS
The positive and statistically significant coefficient associ-
ated with Quota Index in table 1 indicates that citizens in
countries with an effective quota law express stronger sup-
port for quotas. This suggests that in addition to governance
quality, individuals living in countries with effective quota
laws may also use heuristic information derived from quota
laws to form opinions about state-mandated gender quotas.
Indeed, research suggests that whether people form a pos-
itive or negative opinion regarding a given policy also
depends on how well the policy is designed and imple-
mented (Campbell 2012). According to this perspective,
policy implementation carries “informational content” that
serves as a cue to citizens when deciding their support for
that policy (Pierson 1993, 619). Actual experience with
Figure 4. Effect of Governance Quality by Support for Government Involvement. Mean predicted probabilities were computed based on model 4 in table 1.
Shaded areas represent 95% CIs estimated using the delta method.
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quota implementation may then affect quota support in
ways similar to the ones we hypothesize governance quality
will impact quota support. Effective quota laws might nur-
ture public support for quotas, particularly among indi-
viduals who strongly support government involvement, and
also reduce the gender gap. To evaluate the predictive power
of our theory on governance quality relative to the plausible
effect of quota implementation, we add a three-way inter-
action between Quota Index, Support for Government In-
volvement, and Sex to the model specification in table 1. See
model 1 in table C1 in the online appendix.
The results from this model specification show that all of
the coefficients associated with the terms used to test hy-
potheses 1–6 are comparable to those in table 1. The co-
efficients are in the same direction, have remarkably similar
magnitudes, and show the same levels of statistical signif-
icance, indicating that the results presented in table 1 are
robust to this new model specification. Additionally, the
coefficient associated with the three-way interaction be-
tween Quota Index, Support for Government Involvement,
and Sex is not statistically significant (pp .217; see model 1
of online table C1).13
The effectiveness of quota laws in a given country can,
however, also impact support for quotas through two other
mechanisms. For one, it may be that the effect of gover-
nance quality on quota support is reinforced by the im-
plementation of effective quotas. Alternatively, it may be
that citizens in countries without quotas are more likely to
use heuristic information derived from governance quality,
whereas in countries with quotas citizens rely more on
information derived from quota design. We tested these
two possibilities by adding an interaction between Gover-
nance Quality and Quota Index to model 1 in table 1 (see
appendix table C2).
The results presented in table 1 are also robust to this
model specification. Again, we find that the signs, mag-
nitudes, and statistical significance of the coefficients that
test our integrative theory remain virtually unchanged when
13. Given that this three-way interaction is not statistically significant,
we reestimate the model without this term. Once again we find that the
Figure 5. Effect of Governance Quality by Sex and Preference for Government Involvement. Mean predicted probabilities were computed based on model 4 in
table 1. Shaded areas represent 95% CIs estimated using the delta method.
results support all our hypotheses (hypotheses 1–6). The results of this
new model estimation also show a negative and significant relationship
between Quota Index and Sex and a positive and significant relationship
between Quota Index and Support for Government Involvement (model 2
of table C1). To further investigate these findings, we graph and explain
these results in figs. C1 and C2 in the appendix. The effects associated with
the quota index are much smaller than the conditional effects of general
governance effectiveness and, as noted, do not compromise in any way the
robust effects described thus far.
Volume 78 Number 3 July 2016 / 683
we add this interaction term.We do, however, find a negative
and significant interaction term between Governance Quality
and Quota Index (p ! . 05), indicating that the effectiveness
of quota laws do moderate the relationship between gover-
nance quality and support for quotas. To evaluate the di-
rection and magnitude of this effect, we graph the predicted
probability of strongly supporting quotas across the entire
range of the Government Capabilities Index for countries
without a quota (Quota Index p 0) and countries with the
most effective quotas (Quota Index p 3). See appendix,
figure C3.
We observe that a better track record of governance
quality is associated with a higher overall level of support for
quotas in countries with and without quotas but that the
effect of governance quality is slightly stronger in countries
without quotas. As one moves from countries with the
lowest to the highest governance quality, the increase in
quota support is only 4 percentage points higher in countries
without quotas than in countries with the most effective
quotas. This weak moderating effect does not change our
overall conclusion regarding the importance of governance
quality. The relationship between good governance and
support for quotas is strong and positive, regardless of the
implementation or design of gender quotas. In short, indi-
viduals are not relying on governance quality as a heuristic
only in the absence of quotas.
CONCLUSIONS
Our theoretical framework and findings provide a new lens
for examining the determinants of citizen support for gender
quotas, in particular, as well as support for other affirmative
action policies and state-led initiatives aimed at improving
democracy more generally. Specifically, our theory and
findings on support for gender quotas can guide future re-
search to identify how governance quality impacts citizen
support for other policies. Our study provides a systematic
analysis of how governance quality, individual traits, and
political values shape citizen support for gender quotas
across 24 countries, making it the most comprehensive study
of its kind. We conclude by briefly describing our main
findings and discussing their policy implications as well as
their relevance for the study of citizen support for other
state-led initiatives.
The first finding to emerge from our research is that
citizens’ normative beliefs about the role of government in
society are important determinants of support for quota
policies, independent of other individual level factors such
as self-interest, gender egalitarian attitudes, and ideology.
Individuals who strongly support government action in
the improvement of citizens’ well-being are more likely to
support gender quotas. Moreover, consistent with our ex-
pectations, high support for government involvement re-
sults in stronger quota support among women than men—
most likely because women are more prone than men to
attribute gender disparities to unfair treatment rather than
to women’s decisions.
Further, citizens also rely on heuristic information they
draw on from their national context to determine their level
of quota support. A government’s track record of gover-
nance quality serves as a cue to citizens trying to decide
their level of quota support, and men are more inclined to
resort to this contextual information than women. Conse-
quently, government credibility exerts a stronger positive
impact on men’s support for quotas than women’s. In ad-
dition, the effect of good governance is strongest among
citizens who favor government involvement. In the end,
our results indicate that, compared to countries with poor
governance, countries with a track record of good gover-
nance quality display higher levels of citizen support for
quotas—particularly among those who strongly support
government involvement—and a smaller overall gender
gap in quota support.
The stronger effect of governance quality on quota
support among men than women suggests that good gov-
ernance may also narrow the gender gap in citizen support
for other gender equality policies, such as fair pay and equal
access to employment. Beyond gender issues, governance
quality can play a role in shaping support for other affir-
mative action policies currently topping the agendas of
political elites and international organizations, such as
state-mandated quotas (or reserved seats) for ethnic and
religious minorities in political decision-making bodies.
Latin American countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, Peru,
and Venezuela have all adopted ethnic quotas. Quotas for
minorities have also been adopted in other socially and
ethnically diverse countries across the globe (Bjarnegård
and Zetterberg 2014; Krook and O’Brien 2010). Conse-
quently, although political values such as support for gov-
ernment involvement may help explain attitude formation
for policies intended to improve the lives of marginalized
citizens, support for affirmative action policies in general is
likely to be highest in countries with good governance.
In addition to engendering support for affirmative ac-
tion policies, government capacity has the potential to also
impact attitude formation toward other state-led initiatives,
such as institutional or electoral reforms, that are salient in
Latin America and other newly established democracies. In
recent years, several Latin American countries have un-
dergone a number of institutional reforms, including gov-
ernment decentralization and electoral reforms such as new
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ballot designs and state-mandated primary elections. Our
research suggests that if states demonstrate weak capacity
to govern, it is unlikely that institutional and electoral re-
forms will be highly supported by the citizenry.
We conclude by highlighting the policy implications of our
results. Our findings suggest that investments in strength-
ening state capacity can nurture political legitimacy by in-
creasing citizen support for gender quota policies. Ultimately,
high support for quotas can serve to pressure political elites
to adopt, maintain, and strengthen gender quota laws and
thus guarantee their continued success. Hence, our findings
stress the importance of organizations devoted to improving
governance quality across the globe. Well-performing gov-
ernments are fundamental for achieving citizen support for
public policies to reduce gender inequalities, and thus for
promoting representative democracies. Good governance can
aid in the building of stronger democracies by enhancing
citizen support for policies that provide women with more
opportunities to be part of their country’s economic, social,
and political life.
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